THE IMPACT OF INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ON THE DAY-TO-DAY BEHAVIORS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

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Abstract

How does interior immigration enforcement affect the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants? Although there is some evidence that points to a broad range of “chilling effects” that result when local law enforcement officials work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on federal immigration enforcement, the academic literature is surprisingly sparse. In this study, we embedded an experiment in a survey (n = 594) drawn from a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants in order to better understand how the behaviors of undocumented immigrants are affected when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement. When respondents are told that local law enforcement officials are working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, they are 60.8 percent less likely to report crimes they witness to the police, 42.9 percent less likely to report crimes they are victims of to the police, 69.6 percent less likely to use public services that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, 63.9 percent less likely to do business that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, and are even 68.3 percent less likely to participate in public events where the police may be present, among other findings.

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Introduction

Immigration continues to be a highly salient issue and interior immigration enforcement, in particular, has become a focal point in the broader debate over comprehensive immigration reform. As Congress remains gridlocked, policy debates over interior immigration enforcement are increasingly taking place between the federal government and state and local governments. For example, shortly after taking office, President Trump signed an executive order (Executive Order 13768) making so-called sanctuary jurisdictions, meaning state and local governments that delimit the extent to which local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement, ineligible for certain federal funding, including law enforcement grants.¹ This executive order is part of recent efforts to increase local law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration enforcement officials. This, alongside other changes to how the Trump administration carries out the work of interior immigration enforcement—most notably, the elimination of Obama-era immigration enforcement priorities, which has subsequently resulted in undocumented immigrants being apprehended in places previously considered off-limits, such as hospitals, schools, and courthouses²—has renewed interest in questions examining the impact of interior immigration enforcement policies. In this study, we examine the impact that interior immigration enforcement has on the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants.

How does interior immigration enforcement affect the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants? More specifically, do the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants change when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement? Although there is some evidence that points to “chilling effects” that result when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement, the academic literature is surprisingly sparse. We argue that increased interior immigration enforcement, by design, creates uncertainties for undocumented immigrants (i.e., non-zero probabilities of apprehension, detention, and deportation) that make them cautious about interacting with local law enforcement officials. However, when coupled with an increasingly restrictive federal immigration policy context, increased interior immigration enforcement can have effects that extend beyond interactions with local law enforcement officials and seep into the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants, which negatively and significantly affects their broader societal incorporation. We provide evidence of this by embedding an experiment in a survey (n = 594) drawn from a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants in order to better understand how the behaviors of

¹See Executive Order 13768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” which was signed by President Trump on January 25, 2017.
²See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Memorandum, “Enforcement Actions at or Focused on Sensitive Locations,” which was signed by then-ICE Director John Morton on October 24th, 2011. See also U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Memorandum, “Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest,” signed by then-DHS Secretary John Kelly on February 20th, 2017, that stated, “all existing conflicting directives, memoranda, or field guidance regarding the enforcement of our immigration laws and priorities for removal are hereby immediately rescinded.”
undocumented immigrants change when local law enforcement officials are working with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on federal immigration enforcement. We find that when local law enforcement officials are working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, respondents are significantly less likely to report crimes to the police, participate in public events where the police may be present, engage in activities, including help-seeking activities, that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, place their children in after-school or day-care programs, and look for a new job.

We begin by evaluating the literature on the impact of interior immigration enforcement policies, paying particular attention to research that examines how the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants are affected by these policies. We then derive a set of hypotheses about how the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants might be affected when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement. After this, we describe the survey vehicle used to test our hypotheses and our survey experiment, wherein respondents are randomly assigned to conditions that vary the interior immigration enforcement context (i.e., local law enforcement officials are working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement or they are not working together with ICE). We then discuss the findings of the survey experiment and the implications of the results.

States, Localities, and the Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws

The federal government regulates immigration and is responsible for enforcing federal immigration laws. However, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which was passed in 1996, helped reshape the modern landscape of interior immigration enforcement in the U.S. by establishing a process whereby state and local governments could enter into formal agreements with federal immigration enforcement agencies in order to identify, apprehend, and detain undocumented immigrants.\(^3\) Whereas the number of these agreements, which are referred to as 287(g) agreements, expanded significantly during the Bush administration, the Obama administration moved to phase them out.\(^4\) The pendulum swung again as a result of the 2016 presidential election. The Trump administration, consistent with the executive order and the changes to immigration enforcement priorities described above, has worked aggressively to recruit more states and localities to work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement.\(^5\) In July 2017, for example, the administration

\(^3\)These formal agreements are referred to as 287(g) agreements, named for Section 287(g) of the IIRIRA. See Wong (2012) for the expansion of the 287(g) program and the determinants of 287(g) agreements and Wong (2017a) for a primer on interior immigration enforcement policies.

\(^4\)See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2013: Budget in Brief.” In its Fiscal Year 2013 budget request, the Obama administration noted, “ICE will begin by discontinuing the least productive 287(g) task force agreements in those jurisdictions where Secure Communities is already in place and will also suspend consideration of any requests for new 287(g) task forces” (p. 16).

\(^5\)More than just recruiting states and localities to work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, the Trump administration has also sued the State of California over SB 54, which among
held a press conference touting the signing of eighteen new 287(g) agreements with eighteen counties in the State of Texas. As indicated in its press release, “With the addition of these 18 agreements, ICE now has 60 active 287(g) agreements, which is nearly double the number of active programs in 2016. This also marks the largest expansion of the program in recent years.”

In addition to formal agreements with federal immigration enforcement agencies, the landscape of interior immigration enforcement in the U.S. is dotted with state laws and local ordinances. Some states and localities have passed laws and ordinances designed to further tighten interior immigration enforcement efforts. These laws and ordinances, for example, require state and local police to check the immigration status of a person if a law enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is undocumented (e.g., SB 1070 in Arizona, SB 4 in Texas), prevents state and local governments from enacting so-called sanctuary policies (e.g., HB 2315 in Tennessee), and prohibits the letting, leasing, or renting of apartments or homes to undocumented immigrants (e.g., Ordinance 2006-18 in the City of Hazelton, Pennsylvania), among other provisions. In contrast, other states and localities have passed laws and ordinances designed to delimit the extent to which local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement. These laws and ordinances, for example, prohibit law enforcement agencies from using public resources to “investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes” (e.g., SB 54 in California) and forbids city officials, including law enforcement officers, from inquiring about immigration status, among other provisions.

**Literature Review**

Against the backdrop of federal immigration enforcement agencies working to apprehend, detain, and deport undocumented immigrants, some states and localities working with them, and other states and localities delimiting the extent to which

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7According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), since 2010, states have enacted 1,274 immigration-related laws and 207 of these have focused on immigration enforcement (NCSL 2018).

8See Section 2(B) of SB 1070 in Arizona.

9See HB 2315 in Tennessee, which took effect on January 1, 2019.

10See Section 5 of Ordinance 2006-18 of the City of Hazelton Illegal Immigration Relief Act.

11See Section 7284.6 of SB 54.

12One estimate finds that there are at least 54 cities that have passed ordinances that forbid city officials, including law enforcement officers, from inquiring about a person’s immigration status (Gonzalez O’Brien et al. 2017).
local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement, it has become increasingly important to examine the impact that interior immigration enforcement has on undocumented immigrants. We review the existing literature with an eye toward research that examines outcomes subsequent to states or localities tightening interior immigration enforcement efforts by working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement (for a related literature on why some localities work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement and others do not, see Lewis et al. 2012; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Wong 2012). Below, we discuss findings related to public safety, public health, education, and employment.

Impact on Public Safety

Some local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) argue that doing the work of federal immigration enforcement is necessary to ensuring public safety, as doing so will decrease crime. This argument, however, is not supported by the available empirical evidence. Indeed, studies to date have shown that crime rates are either lower in sanctuary jurisdictions compared to comparable non-sanctuary jurisdictions or that there is a null relationship between sanctuary jurisdictions and crime rates. For example, using administrative data from ICE, Wong (2017b) finds that violent and property crime rates are lower in sanctuary counties, defined in terms of responsiveness to administrative hold and detainer requests, compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. Lyons, Vélez, and Santoro (2013) show that city-level sanctuary policies help explain the oft-cited finding that crime is lower in places where there are more immigrants (for example, see Ousey and Kubrin 2018; see also Light and Miller 2018). In analyzing homicide and robbery incidents over three decades from 1990 to 2010, Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez (2017) find that city-level sanctuary policies are negatively and significantly related to fewer robberies, but have a null effect on homicides. Last, Gonzalez O’Brien, Collingwood, and El Khatib (2017) find no statistically significant differences in violent or property crime rates between sanctuary cities and comparable non-sanctuary cities, which leads them to conclude, “The potential benefits of sanctuary cities, such as better incorporation of the undocumented community and cooperation with the police, thus have little cost for the cities in question in terms of crime” (p. 1). Studies have also examined crime rates subsequent to LEAs tightening cooperation with federal immigration enforcement agencies. For example, Miles and Cox (2014) used the staggered rollout of the Secure Communities program, which was first piloted in a limited number of jurisdictions in 2008 and then “activated” across all counties by 2013, to obtain differences-in-differences estimates of the impact that the program had on crime rates. They state clearly, “The results show that the Secure Communities program has had no observable effect on the overall crime rate” (p. 937). Treyger, Chalfin, and Loeffler (2014) also find that the Secure Communi-

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13Under the Secure Communities program, the fingerprints of every individual booked into a jail is checked against a number of federal law enforcement databases, including IDENT, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security database. Prior to Secure Communities, the fingerprints of an individual booked into a jail would typically only be cross-referenced with IAFIS, which is an FBI database.
ties program had mostly null effects on violent and property crime rates (and also negative or positive coefficients depending on model specification).

Increased interior immigration enforcement, rather than decreasing crime, can sow distrust and fear in local law enforcement among immigrant communities, which can undermine public safety. For example, using a combination of qualitative interviews, focus groups, and other similar methods, Nguyen and Gill (2016) find that the implementation of the 287(g) program in two jurisdictions in North Carolina created fear and distrust of law enforcement, so much so that the immigrants they interviewed “became reluctant to leave their houses or drive anywhere due to fear of encountering the police […] because of their new role as “la migra” or immigration agents” (p. 14-15). This distrust is consequential for public safety because, as Comino, Mastrobuoni, and Nicolò (2016) find, undocumented immigrants are already considerably less likely to report crime to the police, even despite their victimization. Other studies provide additional evidence that gives cause for these concerns. For example, in analyzing the text of arrest reports before and after the implementation of the 287(g) program in Davidson County, Tennessee, Donato and Rodríguez (2014) find significant differences in the reasons given for arrests, in particular, that characteristics related to foreignness, “such as country of origin, language use, and legal status […] became more salient after 287(g)” (p. 1696). More generally, a report by the non-partisan U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concludes that the 287(g) program suffers from lack of oversight and accountability and that “over half of the 29 [LEAs] GAO contacted reported concerns from community members that use of program authority would lead to racial profiling and intimidation by law enforcement officials” (GAO 2009, p. i). These effects are especially problematic, as some immigrants are already mistrustful of law enforcement due to negative experiences with police in their home countries, among other factors (Menjívar and Bejarano 2004). One important implication of this distrust and fear is decreased reporting of crimes to law enforcement. Based on survey data in four metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, Houston, Phoenix, and Chicago), Menjívar et al. (2018) find that “documented” Hispanics/Latinos and, in some cases, native-born Hispanics/Latinos, are less likely to report crimes to the police depending on the interior immigration enforcement context.

Although less systematically studied, other interior immigration enforcement policies, such as immigration enforcement actions (i.e., apprehensions) at courthouses, appear to similarly sow distrust and fear, and with similar consequences. For example, in August 2017, Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman held a news conference calling for an end to ICE enforcement actions in New York courthouses. Gonzalez stated that immigration enforcement actions at courthouses discourage immigrants from showing up as witnesses and even defendants (New York State Office of the Attorney General 2017). Then, in February 2018, numerous officials in the City of New York penned an open letter calling for a ban on ICE from courthouses, as their presence has “created

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14 Armenta (2015) also finds that police officers in Nashville, Tennessee, which is located in Davidson County, worked at cross-purposes by, on the one hand, attempting to increase trust and communication with Hispanics/Latinos while on the other hand, citing and arresting Hispanics/Latinos for not having state-issued identification.
widespread fear of the courts in immigrant and mixed-status communities. Statistics and reports from across New York State confirm that immigrants are declining to appear in court or to initiate legal actions due to fear of ICE” (Council of the City of New York 2018).

We thus hypothesize that when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, undocumented immigrants will not only be less likely to report crimes that they witness to the police \( (H_1) \), but they will also be less likely to report crimes that they are victims of to the police \( (H_2) \). Moreover, because distrust can be exacerbated by the interior immigration enforcement context, we also hypothesize that undocumented immigrants will be less likely to participate in public events where law enforcement may be present when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement \( (H_3) \).

**Accessing Public Services**

How does increased interior immigration enforcement affect access to public services among undocumented immigrants? On this question, the literature is arguably strongest when it comes to public health services. Indeed, there is a small, but persuasive literature that has uncovered a number of adverse public health effects tied to increased interior immigration enforcement. Several studies have examined the impact of restrictive state-level immigration laws. For example, after the passage of California’s Proposition 187 in 1994, undocumented immigrants were less likely to obtain medical care because of their immigration status. Proposition 187 would have made undocumented immigrants ineligible for public services, including publicly-funded health services, and would have also required public employees to report undocumented immigrants to the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Asch, Leake, and Gelberg (1994) find that in the wake of Proposition 187, undocumented tuberculosis patients not only feared that going to a doctor would result in an immigration enforcement action, but were four times more likely to delay seeking care. Moreover, in analyzing administrative data from the San Francisco County Division of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services (DMS) system, Fenton, Catalano, and Hargreaves (1996) find that Hispanics/Latinos between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were significantly less likely to use outpatient services and were significantly more likely to use crisis services when comparing the year before and after the passage of Proposition 187. Although it was ultimately enjoined and declared unconstitutional, the deleterious health effects of Proposition 187 were indelible.\(^{15}\)

Over a decade later, research on similar restrictive state-level immigration laws—e.g.,

\(^{15}\)Moreover, in analyzing survey data from 1996 and 1997, Berk et al. (2000) attribute changes in the health seeking behaviors of undocumented immigrants, not just in California, but also in Texas, to the chilling effects of Proposition 187. They write, “The debate over California’s Proposition 187 caused concern among public health advocates about whether undocumented immigrants might avoid seeking health care […]. When asked if they were afraid they would not receive care because of their immigration status, 33 percent of the undocumented persons in Houston, 36 percent of those in Los Angeles, 47 percent of those in Fresno, and 50 percent of persons in El Paso responded affirmatively” (p. 60).
Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), Alabama’s House Bill 56 (HB 56), and Georgia’s House Bill 87 (HB 87)—has found similar effects. In Arizona, Hardy et al. (2012) find that SB 1070 “changed the health-seeking behaviors of residents of a predominately Latino neighborhood by increasing fear, limiting residents’ mobility, and diminishing trust in officials” (p. 1250). As the passage of SB 1070 coincided with their longitudinal study of the health and development of Mexican-origin adolescent mothers and their infants (March 2007 to December 2011), Toomey et al. (2014) were able to analyze pre- and post-trends, finding that young mothers were less likely to use preventative health care after the passage of SB 1070, among other similar findings. Using county administrative health data, White et al. (2014a) find a significant decline in the use of county public health services among Hispanics/Latinos when comparing the year before and after the passage of HB 56, even for public health services that were exempt from the law (i.e., immunizations and treatment for communicable diseases).16 When comparing pediatric emergency department visits in Georgia in the four months after the passage of HB 87 to the same period in 2009 and 2010, Beniflah et al. (2013) find that emergency department visits declined only for Hispanics/Latinos. Moreover, when analyzing the acuity of care, they find evidence to suggest that Hispanics/Latinos were putting off minor health issues until these issues spiraled, thus resulting in preventable admissions to hospitals.

Research has also examined the effects of 287(g) and Secure Communities. Wang and Kaushal (2018) use the restricted-use National Health Interview Survey for 2000 to 2012 and exploit time variation (i.e., when 287(g) agreements were adopted and the staggered rollout of Secure Communities) to obtain differences-in-differences estimates for Hispanics/Latinos across a number of items in the questionnaire. They find that 287(g) and Secure Communities worsened mental health distress scores among Hispanics/Latinos, among other findings.

More generally, research shows how concerns about immigration enforcement not only have negative implications for undocumented immigrants, but can also affect American citizen children who are part of mixed immigration status families. For example, Watson (2014) finds that after the passage of IIRIRA in 1996, Medicaid participation among children of noncitizens decreased significantly, even among the American citizen children of noncitizens.17

As the discussion above makes clear, chilling effects as they relate to public health are well documented. We argue, however, that against the backdrop of increasingly restrictive federal immigration policies, the effects of increased interior immigration enforcement seep more pervasively into the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants than has been previously documented. We thus hypothesize that when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement,

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16 In a separate study, White et al. (2014b) used in-depth interviews to identify three main concerns, which were uncertainty about the availability of health services (and even if they were available, if undocumented immigrants would receive care), affordability (i.e., being unable to pay for care from private providers), and abuse or mistreatment by health care professionals.

17 In addition to formal policies, ICE enforcement actions (i.e., immigration raids) also have important public health implications. See, for example, Lopez et al. (2017). See also Capps et al. (2007).
undocumented immigrants will be less likely to use public services in general, not just public health services, when doing so requires them to disclose their personal contact information ($H_4$). We also extend beyond public services by hypothesizing that when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, undocumented immigrants will be less likely to do business (e.g. open a bank account, get a loan) when doing so requires them to disclose their personal contact information ($H_5$).

**Children and Schools**

Research has also shown that increased interior immigration enforcement, measured by immigration enforcement actions (i.e., immigration raids), can negatively impact public education. For example, when using an index of the intensity of interior immigration enforcement at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez (2015) find that interior immigration enforcement increases the probability that a young child (children between the ages of six and thirteen) repeats a grade by 6 percent and increases their likelihood of dropping out of school by 25 percent. Moreover, Capps et al. (2007) studied the immediate aftermath of three large-scale worksite immigration enforcement actions in three different communities. They find that on the day of the enforcement actions, schools played an important role “in ensuring that children were not dropped off to empty homes or left at school overnight” (p. 3). But despite these efforts, some children did walk to empty homes. Moreover, “After the arrest or disappearance of their parents, children experienced feelings of abandonment and showed symptoms of emotional trauma, psychological duress, and mental health problems” (p. 6). It is thus perhaps intuitive that Chaudry et al. (2010) find that children missed school in the aftermath of the immigration enforcement actions they researched, in addition to experiencing similar traumas to those described above (see also Lopez et al. 2017).

More to the point, whereas undocumented parents might very well trust that schools are safe spaces for their children, they also may be concerned about immigration enforcement actions occurring at or around schools. Indeed, during the Obama administration, the “sensitive locations” memo stated, “This memorandum sets forth Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policy regarding certain enforcement actions by ICE officers and agents [...] This policy is designed to ensure that these enforcement actions do not occur at nor are focused on sensitive locations such as schools and churches” (ICE 2011, p. 1). However, as headlines such as “Immigrant arrested by ICE after dropping daughter off at school, sending shockwaves through neighborhood” are currently part of conversations about interior immigration enforcement conversation, we hypothesize that when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, undocumented parents will be less likely to place their children in an after-school or day-care program ($H_6$).
Impact on Employment

Increased interior enforcement can affect undocumented immigrants in the workplace in at least two ways: it can increase concerns about worksite immigration enforcement actions and deportation and it can exacerbate power dynamics, wherein undocumented workers are less likely to voice concerns to their employers and advocate for their own rights. For example, in surveying Hispanic/Latino immigrant restaurant workers in San Jose, California and Houston, Texas, Gleeson (2010) finds that although undocumented workers have sufficient knowledge of their rights, and despite employers not having made explicit threats to “call immigration,” workers still chose not to come forward with their concerns (which included verbal abuse, no work breaks or meal hours, and wage theft) so as to not attract attention to their immigration status. As Harrison and Lloyd (2011) argue, increased interior immigration enforcement can create a pervasive sense of being surveilled by their employers, which can lock undocumented workers into exploitative conditions.

While there is no systematic research that we are aware of about how increased interior immigration enforcement affects reporting of abuses by undocumented workers, data from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) Bureau of Labor Statistics show that Hispanics/Latinos report occupational injury/illness and fatal injury at a lower rate than what is proportional to their share in the total workforce.\textsuperscript{18} We thus hypothesize that local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, undocumented workers will be less likely to look for new jobs ($H_7$).

Data and Method

To test our hypotheses, we embedded an experiment in a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants in San Diego. The survey vehicle used in this study is the Undocumented in America project based out of the U.S. Immigration Policy Center (USIPC) at UC San Diego.

Through a partnership between the USIPC and the Mexican Consulate in San Diego (the Consulate), Wong created a sample frame of undocumented Mexican nationals in San Diego County. The sample frame is comprised of individuals who receive consular services unique to those living in the U.S. without authorization. Consulates provide a broad range of services to their nationals abroad. The sample frame, which includes approximately 73,000 people, accounts for nearly the entire universe of undocumented Mexican nationals who currently live in San Diego County. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS), for example, estimates that there are currently 82,406 undocumented immigrants who were born in Mexico who live in San Diego County (CMS 2015). Working with staff at the Consulate, Wong assigned random ID numbers to each record and then cut the sample frame into random draws of

\textsuperscript{18}This information was compiled from the Department of Labor’s data tool (https://data.bls.gov/gqt/InitialPage) and Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey (https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_ua2016.htm) for years 2011-2016.
approximately 5,000 records for each survey module in the Undocumented in America project. Call sheets with limited information about each respondent—the random ID number assigned to each record, first name, and phone number—are then printed out. Phone numbers are manually dialed by enumerators trained by Wong. Phone numbers are dialed once with no additional follow up. After each paper call sheet is completed, it is immediately reviewed and then destroyed. All surveys are conducted in Spanish, unless the respondent prefers to speak in English. In this study, 97.9 percent of surveys were conducted in Spanish. This study is IRB approved (UCSD IRB 180131).

This study represents the first in the Undocumented in America series. The survey was fielded between September 2017 and November 2017 and includes 594 respondents. In the survey, we embedded an experiment in order to better understand how interior immigration enforcement impacts the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants. In the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two groups. In one group \((n = 298 \text{ respondents})\), questions were prefaced with, “If the San Diego Police Department and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department said they WILL NOT WORK WITH ICE on deportation raids, would you be more or less likely to...?” In the second group \((n = 296 \text{ respondents})\), questions were prefaced with, “If the San Diego Police Department and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department WERE WORKING TOGETHER WITH ICE on deportation raids, would you be more or less likely to...?” Respondents were then asked about their likelihood of: reporting a crime that they witnessed to the police; reporting a crime that they were a victim of to the police; using public services that requires them to disclose their personal contact information; doing business that requires them to disclose their personal contact information; participating in public events where police may be present; placing their children in an after-school or day-care program (among those with children); and looking for a new job.

The table below provides the exact text. An experiment such as this is superior to analyzing observational survey data (i.e., survey data that is not based on an experimental design) because asking respondents about one scenario is insufficient for determining how their behavior may or may not change based on the second scenario; asking respondents about one scenario and then the second scenario would likely produce biased results because responses related to the first scenario would likely influence responses to the second scenario (e.g., “I said I would do this in the first scenario, so maybe I should say I wouldn’t do that in the second scenario”); random assignment to one of the two groups balances the two groups across the broad range of covariates (e.g., age, gender, etc.) that need to be controlled for in observational analyses; and random assignment to one of the two groups means that differences in responses can be causally attributed to the variation in the two scenarios (i.e., the treatment effect that results when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement).
Table 1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If the San Diego Police Department and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department [said THEY WILL NOT WORK WITH ICE]/[WERE WORKING TOGETHER WITH ICE] on deportation raids, would you be more or less likely to?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Report a crime that you witnessed to the police?</td>
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<td>- Report a crime that you were a victim of to the police?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Use public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that required you to give your personal contact information?</td>
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<td>- Do business (e.g., open a bank account, get a loan) that required you to give your personal contact information?</td>
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<td>- Participate in public events where police may be present?</td>
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<td>- Place your children in an after-school or day-care program?</td>
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<td>- Look for a new job?</td>
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Results

When respondents are told that local law enforcement officials will work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, they are significantly less likely to engage in a broad range of day-to-day behaviors.

Regarding interactions with the police, when respondents are told that local law enforcement officials will not work with ICE, just 3.4 percent are less likely to report a crime that they witnessed to the police. When respondents are told that local law enforcement officials will work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, this jumps to 64.2 percent. In other words, 60.8 percent of respondents are less likely to report a crime that they witnessed to the police when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement. This result is statistically significant $p < .001$). Moreover, 42.9 percent of respondents are less likely to report a crime that they were a victim of to the police when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement. This result is also statistically significant $p < .001$).

The data show similar chilling effects when it comes to day-to-day behaviors that require undocumented immigrants to disclose their personal contact information. For example, when respondents are told that local law enforcement officials will not work with ICE, just 5.0 percent are less likely to use public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that requires them to disclose their personal contact information. When respondents are told that local law enforcement officials will work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, this jumps to 74.7 percent. In other words, 69.6 percent of respondents are less likely to use public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that requires them to disclose their personal contact information when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement. This result is statistically significant (p < .001). Moreover, 63.9 percent are less likely to do business (e.g., open a bank account, get a loan) that requires them to disclose their personal contact information when local
law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement. This result is also statistically significant ($p < .001$).

Moreover, 68.3 percent of respondents are less likely to participate in public events where police may be present if local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement; among respondents with children, 42.9 percent are less likely to place their children in an after-school or day-care program if local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement; and 52.1 percent of respondents are less likely to look for a new job if local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement.

Table 2 summarizes the results. Figure 1 graphically depicts the results. Two sample t-tests are used to calculate average treatment effects (ATE) and 95 percent confidence intervals. In the figure, behavioral items are sorted along the x-axis by effect size.

### Table 2

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“will not work with ICE” ($n=298$)</th>
<th>“working together with ICE” ($n = 296$)</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report a crime that you witnessed to the police</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>-60.8%</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report a crime that you were victim of to the police</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>-42.9%</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in public events where the police may be present</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>-68.3%</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use public services that require you to give your personal contact information</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>-69.6%</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do business that required you to give your personal contact information</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>-63.9%</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place your children in after-school or daycare program</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>-42.9%</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look for a new job</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>-52.1%</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multivariate Analysis

The differences-in-means between the two experimental conditions are striking, but do the results hold when accounting for other factors? In particular, do the results hold when accounting for factors that may increase concerns about being detained or deported independent of whether local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement? Here, we estimate a series of logistic regression models that estimate the effect of the “working together with ICE” condition while also accounting for whether respondents have children, which may exacerbate concerns about family separation (children), whether respondents have immediate family members, meaning a parent, spouse, or sibling, who are U.S. citizens, which may also exacerbate concerns about family separation, but also increases the stakes of being detained or deported given the possibility that a respondent might be able to file an immigration petition (citizen relative), whether respondents have family members or close friends who have been deported, which makes even more vivid the consequences of immigration enforcement (deport), and whether respondents “strongly agree” or “agree” that they know what their rights are if ICE shows up at their door, as not knowing one’s rights can potentially result in more generalized concerns about immigration enforcement (know rights). We note here that we are limited in the time,
and thus the number of items we can include in each questionnaire.\footnote{19}

Table 3 reports the results. Model 1 examines the likelihood of reporting a crime that respondents witness to the police. Model 2 examines the likelihood of reporting a crime that respondents are victims of to the police. Model 3 examines the likelihood of attending public events where police may be present. Model 4 examines the likelihood of using public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that requires respondents to disclose their personal contact information. Model 5 examines the likelihood of doing business (e.g., open a bank account, get a loan) that requires respondents to disclose their personal contact information. Model 6 examines the likelihood of placing children in an after-school or day-care program (among respondents with children). Model 7 examines the likelihood of looking for a new job.

As the table shows, the effects of the “working together with ICE” condition remain significant for all of the day-to-day behaviors analyzed (see Models 1 to 7). Moreover, the control variables are mostly statistically insignificant. This should not be interpreted to mean that the control variables do not matter. More to the point, the results show that the chilling effects that result when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement are generalized across respondents.

\footnote{19}The first half of the questionnaire is research. The second half of the questionnaire is outreach. The outreach includes providing respondents with “know your rights” information, providing them with information about how to contact the Consulate in the event of an emergency, and referring them to immigration attorneys for free immigration legal screenings. The research questions come before the outreach portion of the questionnaire so as not to bias the results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report Crime</td>
<td>Report Crime</td>
<td>Public Events</td>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>Do Business</td>
<td>After School or Day-Care</td>
<td>Look for New Job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.345)</td>
<td>(.358)</td>
<td>(.285)</td>
<td>(.301)</td>
<td>(.267)</td>
<td>(.469)</td>
<td>(.298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>-368</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>-.096</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.333)</td>
<td>(.325)</td>
<td>(.352)</td>
<td>(.360)</td>
<td>(.339)</td>
<td>(.323)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Relative</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>-.504*</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>-.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.241)</td>
<td>(.233)</td>
<td>(.248)</td>
<td>(.260)</td>
<td>(.237)</td>
<td>(.257)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deport</td>
<td>-.219</td>
<td>-.243</td>
<td>-.375</td>
<td>-.183</td>
<td>-.208</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>-.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.228)</td>
<td>(.221)</td>
<td>(.236)</td>
<td>(.240)</td>
<td>(.225)</td>
<td>(.243)</td>
<td>(.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know Rights</td>
<td>-.144</td>
<td>-.107</td>
<td>-.227</td>
<td>-.036</td>
<td>.414</td>
<td>-.175</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.244)</td>
<td>(.236)</td>
<td>(.253)</td>
<td>(.257)</td>
<td>(.239)</td>
<td>(.261)</td>
<td>(.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.484)</td>
<td>(.480)</td>
<td>(.453)</td>
<td>(.469)</td>
<td>(.420)</td>
<td>(.484)</td>
<td>(.433)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 594

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Discussion and Conclusion

How does interior immigration enforcement affect the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants? In this study, we used a survey experiment to show that when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement, undocumented immigrants are 60.8 percent less likely to report crimes they witness to the police, 42.9 percent less likely to report crimes they are victims of to the police, 69.6 percent less likely to use public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, 63.9 percent less likely to do business (e.g., open a bank account, get a loan) that requires them to disclose their personal contact information, 68.3 percent less likely to participate in public events where the police may be present, 42.9 percent less likely place their children in an after-school or day-care program, and 52.1 percent less likely to look for a new job. These results are robust to whether respondents have children, whether they have immediate family members who are U.S. citizens, whether they have family members or close friends who have been deported, and whether they know what their rights are if ICE shows up at their door.

Our findings add to a growing body of literature that demonstrates the adverse effects that result when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement in several ways. We provide evidence of the magnitude (i.e., effect size) of the chilling effects that result when local law enforcement officials work with ICE on federal immigration enforcement. Our findings thus move the literature forward by showing how pervasively undocumented immigrants are affected by tightened interior immigration enforcement. Our findings also show that the chilling effects of interior immigration enforcement extend well beyond interactions with local law enforcement officials and seeps into a broad range of the day-to-day behaviors of undocumented immigrants. Indeed, although we analyzed seven different behavioral indicators, we likely have only scratched the surface. Moreover, we derive our results using data obtained from a survey experiment that randomly varies the interior immigration context to our respondents. Ours is the only survey experiment that we are aware of that does this using a probability-based sample of undocumented immigrants.

Our findings also have implications for states and localities that are already, or are considering, working with ICE on federal immigration enforcement. To the extent that people, undocumented or not, are less likely to report crimes that they witness, let alone are victims of, to the police, serious public safety implications can result. Being less likely to participate in public events where the police may be present impedes the societal incorporation of undocumented immigrants. Moreover, to the extent that undocumented immigrants are less likely to engage with public institutions, whether this means going to City Hall or going to the bank, they are less likely to obtain services that they may be eligible for and need. When undocumented parents are less likely to enroll their children in an after-school or day-care programs the consequences of tightened interior immigration enforcement accrue to children and may have broader implications for their education and development. And being less likely to look for a new job may lock undocumented workers in exploitative workplaces or
working conditions.

Of course, the purpose of “attrition-through-enforcement” interior immigration enforcement policies is to make conditions of living so harsh that “self-deportation” is preferred to being undocumented. We thus have no illusions that what may be viewed as adverse policy effects to some, may be viewed as desired policy effects to others. These differences notwithstanding, our results underscore the importance and need for more systematic empirical research on the effects of interior immigration enforcement policies. In our own work, we further explore one of the mechanisms that links tightened interior immigration enforcement with decreased interaction with local law enforcement officials, which is decreased trust. We also explore how undocumented immigrants navigate ambiguities in interior immigration enforcement policies at state and local levels (i.e., restrictive state-level laws, but welcoming city-level ordinances, and vice versa). Moreover, whereas we show that the chilling effects of tightened interior immigration enforcement are systematic and pervasive, we also look forward to research about the resistance strategies that undocumented immigrants adopt, particularly against the backdrop of an increasingly restrictive federal immigration policy context.

References


